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Municipal Incorporation and
Territorial Changes in Ohio
By JEFFERSON B. FORDHAAI* AND JOHN DWYER**
This is primarily an expository paper. It is presented as one step
in what the authors hope will be a thorough re-examination of the
subject in Ohio leading to such statutory changes as may be required
to articulate well-considered policy judgments. The Committee on
Local Government Law of the Ohio State Bar Association is actively
concerned with the subject. The members will perform a substantial
public service if they will carry through -the primary study and express
their recommendations in a proposed statute.
That the time has come for this study will appear more clearly to
the reader after he has considered the analysis of present law, which
follows. To the writers it is astounding that the governing legislation
is so largely devoid of policy content and that it has undergone so
little modification over a long period marked by tremeildous urban
development.
INCORPORATION
Prior to the constitution of 1851 the General Assembly was free
to incorporate a municipality by special act.' Section 1 of Article
XIII of that constitution forbade the legislature to pass any special
act conferring corporate powers. This applies to municipal, as well as
private corporations.2 Conceivably, this could be said to have left the
legislature with authority to set up the bare bones of a municipal
government by special act and provide therein that the municipality
should have such powers as might be conferred by general law. That,
however, is strictly academic today because it is dear from the language
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College of Law, The Ohio State University.
* *J. D., Ohio State University, 1952; presently on active duty as First Lieutenant
in the Judge Advocate General's Department of the Army.
1 For a discussion of pre-1851 law and practice see Walker, Municipal Govern-
ment in Ohio before 1912,9 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1948).
2 Township of Northfield v. Macedonia, 22 O.C.C. (N.S.) 50, 33 O.C.D. 445 (1907).
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of the Home Rule Amendment of 1912 that incorporation of munici-
palities must be provided for by general law.3
It has previously been pointed out in the pages of this Journal
that an Ohio municipality cannot be organized in the first instance
under a home rule charter.4 The constitution confers home rule
powers upon municipalities. Charter-making is a home rule power.
There is no entity or public agency to enjoy home rule powers until
incorporation proceedings have been completed under general law.
Under the constitutional classification by population, munici-
palities of less that 5,000 are villages; those of 5,000 or over are cities.
The governing statute, however, does not make provision for original
incorporation as a city of any community of 5,000 or more. The
statute is concerned with incorporation of villages. Thus, under the
statutes dealing with changes in classification, the oversized village
must await the next federal census to achieve recognition as a city.
So long as it acts through general legislation the General Assembly
has a free hand in formulating policy as to municipal incorporation.
There are no other express constitutional limitations. Even so, the fact
that constitutional home rule powers are devolved directly upon all
municipalities has an important bearing upon the shaping of policy as
to incorporation. In Texas it has been held that a home rule munici-
pality is indestructable by the legislature without its consent.5 The
very question is presently being litigated in Ohio.6 Were the Ohio
courts to reach the same conclusion, it would be plain enough to the
writers that extreme care and foresight should be exercised in provid-
ing for the incorporation of indestructable local units.
The Ohio Revised Code sets forth two procedures which may be
followed to incorporate a village. One is initiated by a petition
addressed to county commissioners; 7 the other by a petition addressed
to township trustees.8 The former dates from 1852; 9 the latter was
provided by a statute of 1896.10 In instances where more than one
petition is filed with the commissioners or trustees precedence is
determined by reference to the order of filing."
3 Section 2 of Article XVIII requires that general laws be passed to provide for
the incorporation and government of cities and villages.
4 Fordham and Asher, Home Rule Powers in Theory and Practice, 9 Omo
ST. L.J. 18, 27 (1948).
5 City of Houston v. City of Magnolia Park, 115 Tex. 101, 276 S.W. 685 (1925).
6 In a case involving annexation of a part of the Village of Middleburg Heights
to the adjoining City of Berea without village consent under a statute which antedates
the home rule amendment. The authors have an unofficial report that a ruling
adverse to the village has been made at the court of appeals level.
7 OHIo Rxv. CODE § 707.02 et seq.
8 OHio Rav. CODE § 707.15 et seq.
9 50 OHio LAws 223
10 92 OHIo LAwS 333.
11 State ex rel. Osborn v. Mitchell, 22. O.C.C. 208, 12 O.C.D. 288 (1901),
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COUNTY COMMISSIONER METHOD
The inhabitants of any territory laid off in village lots, or the
inhabitants of any territory which has been laid off in such lots and
surveyed and platted by an engineer or surveyor, may, when the
plat is properly recorded as is provided with respect to deeds, petition
the county commissioners to incorporate. 12 Prior to 1869 it was not
required that the area have been platted.' 3 It is still permissible to
include unplatted land adjacent to the platted core.14 The petition
must be signed by not less than thirty electors residing within the
limits of the proposed corporation and be accompanied by an accurate
map of the territory. There is an exception as to any village organized
upon any island or islands. In such a case platting is not required and
there is no minimum set for the number of petitioners.
Beyond the factor of platting there are scant substantive require-
ments to guide the county commissioners in their determination to
grant or to deny an application for incorporation. Section 707.02 of the
Revised Code provides that the commissioners shall, after determining
that certain procedural requirements have been satisfied, order in-
corporation if the limits of the proposed village are not unreasonably
large or small, if there is the requisite population and if "It is right
that the prayer of the petition be granted."' 5 These are the only
references to area and population. There are no definite minima;
"requisite population" is not elsewhere defined. There is no stated
guide for the commissioners as to "unreasonably large or small" areas.
It can be said, of course, that the language used has to do with the
adequacy and appropriateness of an area for organization as an urban-
type unit of local government. From what perspective, however, is
reasonableness to be regarded-that of the people in the area concerned,
that of the state as a whole, that of the people in neighboring areas
and overlapping units of government, or what?
There are questions as to what adjacent unplatted land may be
included.16 In Hall v. Siegrist, Recorder,17 the court defined "adjacent"
to mean lands lying near the center or nucleus of population so as to
be somewhat suburban in character, and to have some community of
interest with the platted area. There is no express requirement of
compactness, but one may doubt that a configuration which left a no
12 OHIO REv. CODE § 707.02.
13 This jurisdictional requirement was added by 66 OHIo LAWS 150.
14 OHo REV. CODE § 707.04.
15 Prior to the 1953 revision the language was "if it seems to the Commissioners
right that the prayer of the petition be granted." Query as to whether the revision
narrows the discretion of the commissioners.
16 The statute tells us simply that the territory of a proposed municipality may
contain "adjacent territory not laid off into lots."
17 13 Ohio De, (N.P.) 46 (Com. Pleas 1902).
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man's land within points of contact would pass muster. The statute
takes no cognizance of the relation of governmental organization and
administration to actual service areas. It does not exact that there be
even a minimal economic base for urban organization and administra-
tion. It is oblivious to both horizontal and vertical intergovernmental
relations-conspicuously in the metropolitan setting. Thus, it can be
employed for the creation of a tight ring of peripheral municipalities
around a primary city.' s
PROCEDURE
The petition must contain: (1) an accurate description of the
territory . . . ;19 (2) the supposed number of inhabitants residing
therein; (3) the name proposed; and (4) the name of a person to act
as agent for the petitioners, and more than one agent may be named
-therein. The petition must be accompanied by an accurate map of the
territory.
It is required that the petition be presented to the commissioners
at a "regular session." While a special meeting would not do, presenta-
tion at an adjournment or a regular meeting is proper.20 The com-
missioners are to cause the petition to be filed in the county auditor's
office and then fix and communicate to .the petitioners' agent the time
and place of the hearing, which must be more than sixty days after
such filing. It has been decided that the jurisdiction of the county
commissioners is continuing and, thus, that their rejection of a petition
for annexation may be rescinded unless there is a withdrawal of enough
signatures of the petitioners to render the petition ineffectual.2 1
Revised Code, Section 707.05 further requires the agent of the
petitioners to cause a notice containing the substance of the petition,
and the time and place it will be heard, to be published in a news-
18 This situation has been discussed in one common pleas case. The court
declared that a primary city had no standing to enjoin incorporation of an area
lying in the path of the city's anticipated expansion.
19 OHIO REV. CODE § 707.04
A petition does not contain an accurate description when the description
is set out on the back of the petition and is merely referred to by the word "back" in
the body of the petition. Wells v. Brill, Recorder, 9 Ohio N. P. (N.S.) 454 (Com.
Pl. 1909).
A map and description taken from public records of a county suffice although
they are not entirely accurate (greater distance between certain monuments than
shown by records). Turpin v. Hagerty, Recorder, 12 Ohio Dec. (N. P.) 161 (Com.
P1. 1911); af'd without opinion, 69 Ohio St. 534, 70 N.E. 1133 (1903).
20 Turpin v. Hagerty, supra note 19.
21 Pickelheimer v. Urner, 29 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 547 (Com. P1. 1932); afj'd 45
Ohio App. 343, 187 N.E. 123 (1933) (the court of appeals apparently assumed that
commissioner jurisprudence continued).
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paper printed and of general circulation in the county for six con-
secutive weeks, and cause a copy of the notice to be posted in a
conspicuous place within the limits of the proposed village not less
than six weeks prior to the ,time fixed for the hearing. The cases have
been most liberal in determining what is a newspaper of "general
circulation." 22 The number of paid subscribers appears to be of no
importance. 23
The notice requirement is not very explicit. Presumably it calls
for newspaper publication once a week for six consecutive weeks but
it does not expressly so provide. Nor does it expressly ordain that first
publication be made at least six full weeks (forty-two days) before the
hearing, unless the reference at the end of the sentence to six weeks
applies to newspaper publication as well as posting.
Section 707.06 provides for a public hearing or its adjournment,
for interested parties to appear and for amendment of the petition.
Any interested person may appear, in opposition, in person or by
attorney. The commissioners must give consideration -to affidavits filed
pro and con. Nothing is said about oral testimony and argument.
Doubtless, the commissioners could dispense with oral presentation
entirely.
Amendment of a petition may be made at the hearing by leave of
the commissioners. If territory is to be added by such an amendment, a
new time must be fixed for the hearing and a new notice given.
We have the benefit of but limited judicial interpretation of
"person interested." Does it include a corporation, private or public?
Neighboring municipalities have been denied standing to sue.24 A
contrary conclusion has been reached as to a resident property owner
of the remainder of a township whose property was two miles from
the proposed municipality.25 The distinction suggested is between a
private civil interest and the governmental interest of a municipality.
With further reference to the amendment of a petition it seems
safe to say that the petitioners as a body may amend. When, however,
may their agent do so? The supreme court, in Shugars v. Williams,26
allowed ratification of an agent's act of excluding certain territory
22 In State ex rel. Sentinel Co. v. Commissioners of Wood County, 14 C.C. (N.S.)
531,23 C. D. 93 (1910); aff'd 84 Ohio St. 447, 95 N.E. 1157 (1911), the court, in a case
concerning financial reports of county commissioners, said a newspaper was "of gen-
eral circulation" which had a circulation of 800 in a county of 50,000 inhabitants,
35,000 of whom lived in fifteen townships in which the circulation was only 36.
See also State ex rel. Ellis v. Urner, Auditor, 127 Ohio St. 84,186 N.E. 706 (1933);
Bising v. City of Cincinnati, 126 Ohio St. 218,184 N.E. 837 (1933).
23 State ex. rel. Dayton-Oakwood Press, Inc. v. Herman, 70 Ohio App. 103,42 N.E.
2d 703 (1942); Ambos v. Campbell, 40 Ohio App. 346, 178 N.E. 320 (1931).
24 City of Lockland v. Shaver, 98 N.E. 2d 643 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1950).
25 Hall v. Siegrist, Recorder, 13 Ohio Dec. 46 (Com. P1. 1902).
26 Shugars, Clerk v. Williams, 50 Ohio St. 297,34 N.E. 248 (1893).
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described in the petition. In another case, attack upon an agent's action
in drawing in an omitted course in the map attached to the petition
failed.27 Pickelhemer v. Urner2s involved an annexation proceeding
in which an effort was made by petitioners' agent to eliminate territory
from the area described in the application. There had not been ratifica-
tion. The court considered his action unauthorized and upheld an
injunction against the further prosecution of the proceedings. Doubt-
less, an agent may make formal amendments by way of correcting or
perfecting a petition but it is not likely that an amendment by him
which went to the substance and was made without special authority
would stand up. Since, as we have seen, a new hearing is required where
the commissioners permit an amendment adding territory, further
proceedings without a new hearing would be subject to a jurisdictional
defect.29
TowNsHIP TRUSTEE METHOD
The second manner of incorporation relates, in terms, to the
incorporation of "any territory or portion thereof" into a village. It is
initiated by application to township trustees.30 The petition, ac-
companied by an accurate map, must be signed by at least thirty
electors, a majority of whom must be freeholders, and must request
the holding of an election to obtain the "sense" of the electors on
incorporation. The petition must contain, in addition, the matter
required by statute for petitions to "incorporate territory laid off into
village lots." This procedure patently differs from the county com-
missioner method; it calls for an election, and it is required that a
majority of the petitioners be freeholders. Nor is there any provision
for amendment of a petition. 31
In 1947 the Supreme Court, by a five-to-two vote, decided that
this method was cumulative and thus, applied to platted as well as
unplatted areas.32 The problem of interpretations was one of some
difficulty, although the majority did not concede the existence of any
ambiguity in view of the absence of language qualifying the words
"any territory or portion thereof." The dissenters did not find these
words clear, when read with the enacting clause, which described the
measure as supplemental, and with the clause borrowing in part the
27 Pollackv. Toland, 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 315, 15 Ohio C. D. 75 (1903).
28 29 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 547 (Com. P1. 1932); afjd 45 Ohio App. 343, 187 N.E. 123
(1933).
29 OHio REv. CoDE § 707.06.
30 OHIo REV. CODE § 707.15.
31 This procedure does not involve a hearing and, as will be seen, the statute
calls for but brief notice of the election after trustee action on a petition.
32 Wachendorf v. Shaver, Recorder, 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E. 2d 370 (1948).
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procedure applicable to platted areas. This opened for them the
pages of legislative history. There they learned that county com-
missioner jurisdiction had, prior to 1869, extended to applications
relating to platted or unplatted land, that in 1869 the commissioner
method was confined to areas with platted land at the core and that
in 1896 the supplemental measure providing the township trustee
method was enacted.
The desirability of cumulating methods, neither of which has
much policy content, is not evident. Whatever the merits of the
argument on the legal question, the statute practically shouts for
overhauling.
The petition may be presented to the trustees at a "regular or
special session." 33 Upon proof that the petitioners are electors (a
majority of whom are freeholders) residing within the area to be
incorporated the trustees "shall" order an election to be held.34 The
election must be held within fifteen days and the board of elections
must give ten days notice by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation and by posting notice in three or more public places in the
proposed village.35 If a majority of the electors favor incorporation
the trustees "shall then declare that such territory ... be deemed an
incorporated village," and cause a record to be made with the county
recorder.36
This method lacks the meagre substantive requirements of the
county commissioner procedure. It is applicable to unplatted land. As
a matter of fact, it was as we have already noted, not until recent
Supreme Court interpretation, that the method was finally determined
to be cumulative and, thus, available as to either platted or unplatted
land that it was recognized as anything more than a supplemental
device confined to unplatted land.37
The township trustees have no authority to determine whether the
area is unreasonably large or small, whether there is the requisite
population (whatever that may be) and whether it is right that the
prayer be granted. 38 Once they find that certain procedural require-
33 OHo REv. CODE § 707.15.
34 Omo RFv. CODE § 707.16.
35 Id. This is very skimpy notice. It permits use of the trustee method in haste
while an opponent of proposed incorporation is temporarily absent.
36 OHro REV. CODE § 707.18 and 707.19.
37 Prior to Wachendorf v. Shaver, Recorder, supra, note 32, the lower courts had
been split on the question. In accord with that Wachendorfer view: Libby v. Paul,
17 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 433 (Com. Pl. 1915); Hall v. Siegrist, Recorder, 13 Ohio Dec.
(N.P.) 46 (Com. Pl. 1902). Contra: Schorr and Matzer v. Braun, 4 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
561, 17 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 478 (Com. P1. 1906), affd by circuit court (unreported).
38 Wachendorf v. Kearns, Recorder, 33 Ohio Op. 458, 69 N.E. 2d 640 (Com. P1.
1946); overruled by Wachendorf v. Shaver 149 Ohio St. 231, 78 N.E. 2d 370 (1948), on
another ground.
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ments have been met, ,they have no choice but to order an election.3 9
In short, there is practically a policy vacuum apart from the
policy of leaving the entire matter to local decision. It is not suggested,
however, that the statute is open to effective attack as an improper
delegation of legislative power. The Ohio courts are committed to a
very liberal outlook on delegation questions, 40 and a delegation to the
voters is less vulnerable, in any event, than one to administrative hands.
Lawrence v. Mitchell,41 was a suit to enjoin the holding of an
election under Revised Code, Section 707.15. The proceeding was
considered premature; Section 707.20 sets up a later time for judicial
review. The court relied also on the proposition that the power to
hold an election is political and not subject to judicial review. A court
is not free, of course, to prevent the conducting of an election which
has been properly called, or to interfere with the decision of the
electors. If there are legal defects in the calling of an election that is
another matter. Thus, if the trustees act without jurisdiction, to hold
the election would be to make an illegal expenditure of public funds.
In a recent court of appeals case,42 the court laid it down that a writ
of prohibition may be had by a taxpayer to prevent the board of
elections from conducting the election provided for in Section 707.15
where it appears that the action of the trustees is illegal.43 No mention
was made of the Lawrence case.
Mandamus will lie to force the trustees to hold an election. It is
elementary, however, that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy and
will be granted only when a clear, legal right exists. The Supreme
Court, in The State ex rel. Lantz v. The Board of Trustees,4 4 de-
termined that no clear, legal right existed where the map attached to
the petition for incorporation and the area described in the petition
did not coincide.
The statute does not speak to the problem which would arise
were territory proposed to be incorporated so situated as to straddle
the line between two counties. Perhaps the subject is largely academic,
39 The trustees are not required, however, to act immediately; they have a reason-
able time to attend to business on hand. State ex rel. Harms v. Trustees of Euclid
Township, 19 Ohio C. C. 742,9 Ohio C. D. 849 (1899).
40 See, for example State ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District for
Summit County, 120 Ohio St. 464,166 N.E. 407 (1929).
41 8 Ohio N.P. 8, 10 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 265 (Com. P1. 1900); overruled by State ex
rel. Osborn v. Mitchell, 22 Ohio C.C. 208, 12 Ohio C. D. 288 (1901), on other grounds.
42 State ex rel. Young v. Board of Elections of Lucas County, 81 Ohio App. 209,
78 N.E. 2d 761 (1947).
43 The court relied upon two Supreme Court decisions supporting the avail-
ability of prohibition to proven boards of election from placing on ballots names
which legally should not appear on them. State ex rel. Smith v. Hummel Secretary
of State, 146 Ohio St. 341, 66 N.E. 2d 111 (1946); State ex rel. Stanley v. Bernon, 127
Ohio St. 204, 187 N.E. 733 (1933).
44 147 Ohio St. 256,70 N.E. 2d 890 (1946).
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but there is nothing in Ohio's constitutional framework to preclude a
municipality overlapping parts of two or more counties.
JuDiciAL REViEW
Section 707.20 and Sections 707.11 to 707.14, inclusive, provide
for judicial review of incorporation proceedings under either method.
One of the last steps under each method is the filing of a certified
transcript of the proceedings with the county recorder who, at the end
of a stated period and unless enjoined, records it in the proper book of
records, 45 and files a copy with the Secretary of State. The scheme of
judicial review under the statute is to make available during the stated
period, the remedy of injunction against the making of the record and
certification of the transcript by the recorder.
Section 707.11 provides: "within sixty days from the filing of the
papers by the county commissioners with the recorder, any person
interested may make application to the court of common pleas, or if
during vacation, to a judge thereof, setting forth the errors complained
of, or the inaccuracy of the boundaries, or that the limits of the
proposed corporation are unreasonably large or small or that it is not
right just or equitable that the prayer of the petition presented to the
board of commissioners be granted..." and praying for an injunction
restraining the recorder from making the record and certifying the
transcript. Section 707.20 provides: " ... but no injunction shall be
brought, as herein provided in case of filing the transcript with the
county commissioners, unless the action be instituted within ten days
from the filing of the papers by the trustees with the county recorder,
but the right of petition to the court of common pleas for error shall
exist as provided in the following sections of this chapter." (Italics(
added).
The italicized clause poses an interesting problem. One plausible
interpretation is that injunction may only be brought within ten days
for matters of substance,4 6 but may be brought within sixty days for
procedural errors.4 7 A more logical approach is to say that this clause
merely means the procedure before the court of common pleas as is
set forth in Section 707.11 and following, is to be pursued but the
action must be instituted within ten days.48
45 As to what is a proper book of records, see 1943 Opn. Atty. Gen. (Ohio)
No. 6523.
46 That is, that the limits of the proposed corporation are unreasonably large or
small, and so on.
47 That is, that there are inaccuracies in description or other errors in the process
of incorporation.
48 We understand that this is what has been done. There are, however, no de-
cisions in point.
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The review by the common pleas court is not considered an
exercise of a legislative function by the court but is deemed a judicial
review of a non-judicial act.49 We have no difficulty with judicial
review of legislative action by reference to legal limitations on legisla-
tive power but Section 707.11 might be so read as to allow the common
pleas court wholly to re-determine the merits and expediency of in-
corporation. Judicial review in this sphere should be limited to
determining if the commissioners' or trustees' action is arbitrary or
discriminatory.5 0 This is particularly true when it is remembered the
courts have expressly stated that the commissioners and trustees act
under these sections in a legislative, not a judicial, capacity.5 1
If the trustees or commissioners refuse incorporation a different
problem exists. Should the courts undertake to force the legislative
branch to take particular affirmative action where there is any range
for discretion? Further, as a matter of statutory construction, Section
707.11 expressly refers only to actions to restrain the granting of the
petition.
The judgment of the common pleas court may be appealed on
questions of law to the court of appeals.52 It has not, however, been
affirmatively decided by the Supreme Court whether there may be an
appeal on questions of law and fact.53 In Wachendorf v. Shaver, 54 the
Supreme Court recognized this question but did not rule upon it as it
was stated in the lower court by counsel that the question would not
be pressed. One court of appeals has determined that it had no juris-
diction to hear an appeal on questions of law and fact in a proceeding
under Section 707.11 as it is not a chancery case; the court considered
the injunction provided in Section 707.11 as simply an ancillary remedy
to enforce the order of the court.5 5 The question should be examined
in historical perspective. The predecessor statute was enacted in 1869,
which was after the adoption of the code of civil procedure. Since this
proceeding was unknown to chancery courts before the adoption of
the code it appears that ,the cited court of appeals decision was correct.
Who is a proper party plaintiff under Section 707.11? The pro-
ceeding may be instituted by "any person interested." In a common
49 Geauga Improvement Ass'n. v. Lozier, 125 Ohio St. 565, 182 N.E. 489 (1932).
50 It is the local political body upon whom the law has placed the basic responsi-
bility; the appropriate function of a reviewing court is to determine whether there
have been irregularities in procedure or abuse of power.
51 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96 (1860) (an annexation case in which the
relevant procedure as to incorporation was "borrowed").
52 Geauga Improvement Ass'n v. Lozier, supra, note 49.
53 The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to hear appeals on the law and facts
in chancery cases only. Youngstown Municipal Ry. Co. v. City of Youngstown, 147
Ohio St. 221,70 N.E. 2d 649 (1946).
54 149 Ohio St. 231,78 N.E. 2d 370 (1948).
55 Sackett v. Irish, 11 Ohio App. 403 (1918).
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pleas case, decided in 1902, it was determined that a person who owned
a farm two miles from the limits of a proposed hamlet and resided at
least two miles from those limits was an "interested person."5 6 He
would be "affected" by the incorporation in that his taxes would be
increased.
In a recent case the proceeding was instituted by two cities and a
village, which alleged that the incorporation would prevent the avail-
able contiguous area for growth of those units. Relief was denied.57
There is an interpretation section in the Municipal Corporations Title
of the Revised Code (707.01) which reads, in part: ... the word...
'person' includes a private corporation." The court invoked expressio
unius est exclusio alterius to support the conclusion that a municipality
was not a "person" under Section 707.11. Nor had the plaintiffs, in
the courts opinion, asserted the requisite interest, since they did not
rely upon any legal title, right, or interest of a resident of the territory
or of a resident of the remainder of the township, who would be ad-
versely affected by incorporation. This is not very clear; it does not
tell us what the difference between a legal interest and an economic
interest might be.
When a petition for injunction is filed the plaintiff must serve
notice of it in writing upon the agent of the petitioners for incorpora-
tion and upon the county recorder. It is not required that copies be
served. The recorder, on receipt of the notice, must transmit to the
clerk of the court in which the matter is pending, all papers relating
to the proposed incorporation on file in his office. 58
The petition for injunction must be filed with -the court or judge
personally and not with the clerk.59 Under Section 707.13 the judge has
the petition filed in the office of the clerk of the courts. He must
conduct a hearing on the petition not less than twenty days after it is
filed. At the hearing he may hear evidence upon the matters and
things averred in the petition.
In an old annexation case, decided under a statute similar to the
present statutes relating to incorporation, the Supreme Court said
relief must be directly sought as provided in the code, (Section 707.11)
and not collaterally. 60 This was doubtless correct if the court meant that
there can be no collateral attack where the commissioners (or trustees)
act erroneously; however, it would not follow if they had no jurisdic-
tion in the first place.
The curious thing is that the statute requires that the petition for
56 Hall v. Siegrist, Recorder, 13 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 46 (Com. P1. 1902).
57 City of Lockland v. Shaver, 44 Ohio App. 189,98 N.E. 2d 643 (Com. P1. 1950).
58 OHIO REV. CODE § 707.12.
59 Craft v. Schaeffer, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 548 (1941); Hacker v. Payne, 7 Ohio App. 25,
2T Ohio C.A. 449, 29 Ohio C.D. 424 (1916); Ritter v. Falkenburg, 49 Ohio L. Bul. 277
(Com. Pl. 1904).
60 Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96 (1860).
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injunction be dismissed if the judge finds that none of the bases of
attack listed in Section 707.11 are present. We say "curious" for two
reasons. In the first place, the Section 707.11 bases of attack are stated
in the disjunctive; one may rely on any one or all of them as he
thinks may be demonstrated. Section 707.13 consistently permits the
court to hear evidence upon anything averred in the petition and
then, inconsistently calls for dismissal of the petition if none of the
several listed grounds of attack is found to exist. In the second place,
the section opens a township trustee method proceeding to the same
grounds of attack as a proceeding under the county commissioner
method although under the primary statutory provisions, as we have
seen, the township trustee method lacks the meagre substantive re-
quirements of the commissioner method. For example, the court on
judicial review may determine that the limits of the proposed
municipality are unreasonably small or large although the township
trustees had no discretion in the matter.
Section 707.28 sets forth the procedure for the "proper division,"
between the village and the township or townships from which it has
been carved, of real and personal property of the township or town-
ships and of funds for township purposes on hand or in process of
collection. The division is made by the probate court of the county
of situs of the village upon application of the village. The statute does
not provide a standard to guide the probate judge; it does no
more than require him to take the indebtedness of each township
into account. This is not to require apportionment of township
indebtedness.
A court of appeals has held that where there was no township
indebtedness other than certain accounts and notes (presumably of a
current character) the probate court was not in error in ruling that
the only factor to consider in making a proper division was taxable
values in the township and the village.01 On this basis, if the taxable
values in ithe township were $10,000,000 and in the village a like
amount, the split would be fifty-fifty, as it were. Assuming the presence
of a township funded debt of $200,000, how would that factor be taken
into account-by deducting the amount from total divisible assets
before making a division? The statute does not tell us.
What property and funds are divisible? In the last-mentioned case
it was decided that township funds, as follows, were divisible:
a. Special assessment fund (the report does not show whether
any of the property benefitted lay in the village or why it
was not to be considered as dedicated -to payment of the
cost of the improvements for which they were levied. Surely
debt service levies to provide for payment of bond principal
and interest would not be subject to division).
61 In re Village of Eastlake, 88 Ohio App. 25,96 N.E. 2d 435 (1950).
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b. Firemen's indemnity fund.
c. Money received from liquor permits.
d. Tax receipts for the five months after the village came into
existence.
e. Funds on hand or in process of collection arising out of
the general levy.
f. The general fund.
g. Gasoline or liquid fuel fund.
How would the taxable values factor of allocation work as to
township real estate where, for example, the only parcel was the
township hall? Suppose the realty were situated in the village?
What of township contracts? Are they not property? Bilateral
contracts involving township performance would complicate the
problem. Loss of territory to a village might weaken the township's
ability to perform. Is its situation to be aggravated by transferring an
interest in the benefits of the contract to the village? Surely, the
probate court could exact that the burden also be shared.
The statute provides that the findings and orders of the probate
court shall be final. This does not preclude appellate review on
questions of law in view of Section 6 of Article IV of the Ohio Con-
stitution, which provides that the courts of appeals shall have juris-
diction, as may be provided by law, to review judgments on final orders
of courts of record inferior to them.6 2
In an old circuit court case Section 5 of Article XII of the Ohio
Constitution had been interpreted to forbid the division of the proceeds
of a township tax with a village unless there were a correlative village
function to which the village share might still be applied in the
village. 3 That section reads:
No tax shall be levied, except in pursuance of law; and every
law imposing a tax, shall state, distinctly, the object of the
same, to which only, it shall be applied.
It seems pretty clear that this provision is directed to state, not local
levies. This was pointed out in the recent Eastlake case,64 but the court
relied, as well, upon the conclusion that the township funds in
question were equally applicable to village purposes in any event.
The probate court had, in the Eastlake case, ordered the township
to maintain the roads in the village throughout the year after in-
corporation. This went beyond its statutory authority as to division of
property and funds. By the time the court of appeals so declared, the
year had run (apparently without compliance by the township), and
the court did not actually modify the judgment below in this respect.
62 Id.
63 Township of Northfield v. Village of Macedonia, 21 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 445 (1907).
04 Supra, note 61.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
The final act to bring the new municipality into operating status
is election of officers.65 This may be done at a special election held not
later than six months after incorporation. The agent for the petitioners
sets the date of this election. If a special election is not held, the
initial election of officers of the municipality is the first general election
after its creation. 66
There are similar validating provisions relating to irregular in-
corporation and annexation proceedings. 67 They will be treated
together in this paper at the close of the discussion of annexation.
ANNEXATION IN GENERAL
In 1892 the Ohio Supreme Court decided that the General
Assembly had power to detach territory from a municipality by
special act.68 The statute in question was considered local in nature and
consistent with the constitutional ban on special legislation conferring
corporate powers since it merely detached territory.69 Annexation is
another matter. It at least has the effect of making corporate powers
available in new territory. The more compelling consideration today,
as to both topics, is the Home Rule Amendment of 1912, which ordains
that provision be made by general laws for the incorporation and
government of municipalities.70 We suggest that special legislatiQn as
to annexation or detachment would be out of harmony with the Home
Rule Article.71 In a broad sense, annexation is an aspect of incorpora-
tion- it makes additional people a part of the body of inhabitants
constituting the corporation. Conversely, detachment would usually
reduce the members of the corporate body. Both annexation and
detachment, moreover, affect municipal government directly, in terms
of jurisdiction but not of structure and general powers and procedures.
65 Omo REv. CODE § 707.21.
66 OHIO REv. CODE § 707.27 through 707.26 relate to proceedings involving terrf-
tory situated in more than one county, jurisdiction of municipal officers and proceed-
ings to change municipal names.
67 OHio REv. CODE § 707.27 and 709.21.
68 Metcalf, Auditor v. State, 49 Ohio St. 586, 31 N.E. 1076 (1892).
69 Ohio Constitution,.Article XIII, Section 1, forbids the enactment ot any "spe-
cial act conferring corporate powers."
70 Ohio Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 2, provides, in part, that "General
laws shall be passed to provide for the incorporation and government of cities and
villages ..."
71 In Schultz v. City of Upper Arlington, 88 Ohio App. 281, 97 N.E. 2d 218 (1950),
annexation was classified as a matter of a "general nature" as distinguished from a
home rule subject. It will be remembered that Section 26 of Article H of the Ohio
Constitution requires that all laws of a "general nature" shall have a uniform opera-
tion throughout the state. This point is noted in passing. The basic proposition here
is that the Home Rule Amendment outlaws special legislation as to municipalities.
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Is annexation a home rule matter? The Supreme Court of
Missouri recently decided that the constitutional grant of authority to
a city to amend a home-rule charter was broad enough to enable the
city to annex territory lying just across a navigable river in the next
county without benefit of enabling legislation. 72 The court character-
ized the power as necessary to the objects and very existence of the
municipality.
A recent Ohio appellate court decision affords a strong contrast.
As will appear more fully later the Ohio annexation statute requires
that annexation initiated by freeholders residing in an area proposed
to be annexed be accepted by the governing body of the municipality.
The home rule charter of the City of Upper Arlington rendered such
an annexation subject to compulsory referendum. The court refused
to give effect to the charter provision. Annexation was treated as a
subject of a general nature, state-wide in scope and, thus, not within
the constitutional grant to municipalities of all powers of local self-
government. The statute, accordingly, controlled. The charter pro-
vision was set aside as in conflict with the statute.73
Certainly a rational argument can be made to sustain the con-
clusion that the power of annexation is not a home rule power. It
involves people, territory, and interests beyond the limits of a munici-
pality. Policy considerations affect the state and -the larger local com-
munity as well as the municipality. This is far from saying, however,
that a municipality is not even free to provide, by home rule charter,
who shall speak for it in accepting annexations initiated by outside
folks. Is that not an internal arrangement which does not affect the
basic policy of the statute?
Provision for annexation, in reality, is an extension of the power
of incorporation. Statutes relating to the general subject of incorpora-
tion of villages and of annexation of territory to villages already
created are, the Ohio Supreme Court has declared, to be treated as
one for purposes of construction and interpretation. 74
Two modes of anexation are authorized by the Ohio Revised
Code. They are: (1) annexation on application of adult freeholders
residing on territory adjacent to a municipality; 75 and (2) annexation
on application of a municipal corporation.76 A related.subject, con-
solidation and merger of municipalities, 77 is not within the scope
72 State ex inf. Taylor, Atty. Gen., ex rel. Kansas City v. North Kansas City, 360
Mo. 374,228 S.W. 2d 762 (1950).
73 Schultz v. City of Upper Arlington, supra, note 71. Accord: City of Cincinnati
v. Rosi, 92 Ohio App. 8, 109 N.E. 2d 290 (1952).
74 Shugars, Clerk v. Williams, 50 Ohio St. 297, N.E. 248 (1893).
75 OHio REv. CODE § 709.02 et seq.
76 Omo REv. CODE § 709.13 et seq.
77 OHIo REv. CODE § 709.22 et seq,
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of 'this paper. The two modes of annexation have several elements in
common and because of this will be treated insofar as possible, together.
I. ANNEXATION ON APPLICATION oF FREEHOLDERS
The inhabitants residing on territory adjacent78 to a municipality
may, by petition to the county commissioners, 79 apply for annexation
to the municipality. The petition must be "signed by a majority of
the adult freeholders residing on such territory, and shall contain the
name of a person authorized to act as the agent of the petitioners...
and a full description of the territory, and be accompanied by an
accurate map80 or plat thereof." The petition must be presented at
a regular session of the commissioners, and when presented the same
proceedings must be had "as far as applicable, and the same duties
in respect thereto shall be performed by the commissioners and other
officers, as required in case of an application to be organized into
a village .... 81
The territory to be annexed must be adjacent to the municipal-
ity.82 Any other substantive limitation upon the commissioners must
come from the statutes pertaining to incorporation, which, by Section
709.03 are made a part of this annexation procedure "as far as ap-
plicable." Does this reference incorporate Section 707.07, which gives
the commissioners discretion to determine if the territory is un-
reasonably large or small and if it seems right that annexation (in-
corporation) be granted? The commissioners are required by Section
709.03 to perform the "same duties" with respect to annexation pro-
ceedings as they do with respect to incorporation proceedings. This
clause appears to authorize their use of discretion, and, in fact, would
appear to be of little force in the statute if construed otherwise
because directly preceding the clause it is stated the same "proceed-
ings" shall be had as far as applicable as in applications for incorpora-
tion..It may be suggested that one clause relates to procedure and the
78 Does the word "adjacent" mean the same here as in § 707.04? It was said in
Hall v. Siegrest, Recorder, 13 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 46 (Com. Pl. 1902), that the unplotted
land covered in an application for incorporation must have some community of in-
terest with the plotted area. As a matter of policy and in the larger sense of "com-
munity," this should be so as to annexation.
79 Suppose, as is not uncommon in these days of rapid urban growth there are
competing efforts to incorporate an area and to annex it to a municipality. The pre-
vailing view in other states is that the first proceeding initiated has priority. See Town
of Greenfield v. City of Milwaukee, 259 Wis. 77,47 N.W. 2d 292 (1951). There is some
suggestion in Ohio that the time of filing with the cognizant public body should con-
trol. See City of Cincinnati v. Rosi, supra, note 73; State of Ohio ex rel. Chisholm v.
McKenzie, 16 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 172 (1906).
so As to the accuracy of the map, see note 19, supra.
81 Orno Rv. CoDo § 709.03.
82 Territory on the opposite bank of a navigable river is "contiguous." Blanchard
v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96 (1860).
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other to substantive discretion in the commissioners. This very point
has never been isolated in a court decision; however, an early Supreme
Court case appears to assume the substantive power in the com-
missioners.83
Although the substantive discretion of the commissioners under
Section 707.07 is carried over by Section 709.03, it does not follow
that jurisdictional limitations of Section 707.02 are also incorporated.
In fact, it appears they are not as they are neither a "proceeding (s)"
nor "duties" with respect to "proceedings" as those terms are used in
Section 709.03. Therefore, the territory to be annexed need not be
platted; nor is it material that it includes a county or village in-
firmary8 4
The provisions governing qualifications of petitioners vary ma-
terially from those under the head of incorporation. Incorporators
must be resident electors. A petitioner for annexation must be an
inhabitant of the area to be annexed and be an adult freeholder.
Thus, a county cannot institute proceedings as it can hardly be said
to be a "freeholder," or to "reside" in the area to be annexed.8 5 It is
also difficult to make out a private corporation as a qualified peti-
tioner under Section 709.02. A corporation may be a resident or an
inhabitant for purposes of a particular statute, but it is difficult to
perceive how it can be an "adult freeholder." The Attorney General
has ruled that a private corporation was qualified under Section
709.02.80 The economic interest of the corporation may be very great,
but if it is to be recognized by the statute we would expect to find some
better terminology than "adult" or "freeholder." "Adult" denotes a
natural person of legal age; a "freeholder" includes the holder of a
life estate, which is something that a corporation cannot be.8 7
A petition must contain an accurate description of the territory
and the name of a person to act as agent for the petitioners. More than
one agent may be named. The other elements to be included in a
petition for incorporation are not applicable.88
It will be recalled that Section 707.05 provides that the com-
missioners are to cause a petition for incorporation to be filed in
the county auditor's office for sixty days and to fix a date for hearing
83 Hulbert v. Mason, 29 Ohio St. 562 (1876). See also 1931 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio)
No. 3836. The Hulbert case was overruled, on other grounds, by Geauga Improvement
Ass'n v. Lozier, 125 Ohio St. 565, 182 N.E. 489 (1925).
84 1946 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 1335.
s8 1946 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 1399.
88 1950 Ops, Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 1784.
87 The attorney general took the position that "adult" was used simply to exclude
minors for their own interests. The language, however, is positive and adult could
hardly refer to other than individuals.
88 Such as the name proposed for a municipal corporation.
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which must be more than sixty days after the filing. The agent of
the petitioners must publish a notice of the petition.
It would appear that Section 707.05 is completely applicable to
annexation proceedings but the court, in Pollock v. Toland, held that
the part of -the "section which states that the petition shall be filed
with the county auditor, simply provides for a safe and proper place
for its deposit . . ." and is inapplicable.89 This is a strained, if not a
wholly unwarranted, construction of plain and unambiguous language.
It is hardly to be considered authoritative in view of an earlier case
in which the Supreme Court decided that notice must be posted for
six consecutive weeks in the area to be annexed.90
Section 707.06 requires that the hearing be public, that interested
parties may appear and contest the granting of the prayer of the
petition, and that the petition may be amended. 9 1 In Shugars, Clerk v.
Williams, 92 the Supreme Court declared, in effect, that the incorpora-
tion and the annexation sections are in pari materia; it was determined
that the power to amend conferred by Section 707.06 is available in
annexation proceedings. It appears that Section 707.06 is applicable in
its entirety.
Sections 707.08, 707.09, and 707.10 are inconsistent with Section
709.03 and are inapplicable in this context. These sections relate to
procedural steps to be taken after the commissioners have ordered
incorporation. Those steps include the making of journal entries,
the filing of ,the papers in the proceeding, and subsequent action by
the county with the county recorder. The last sentence of Section
709.03 requires that annexation papers be deposited with the city
auditor or clerk.93
"At the next regular session of the council of the municipality,
after the expiration of sixty days from the date of such filing, the
auditor or clerk shall lay the transcript and the accompanying map or
plat and petition before the council. Thereupon, the council, by
resolution or ordinance, shall accept or reject the application for an-
nexation." 94
In Decker v. City of Toledo,95 the city council of Toledo had
delayed action on an annexation petition for two years and eight
months. The court held the city council had not lost its jurisdiction.
89 1 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 315, 15 Ohio Cir. Dec. 75 (1903).
90 Franklin v. Croll, 31 Ohio St. 647 (1877).
91 Concerning amendment and an agent's authority with respect thereto, see text
above note 26, supra.
92 Note 74, supra.
93 "The final transcript of the board and the accompanying map or plot and peti-
tion shall be deposited with the auditor or clerk of the municipal corporation to which
annexation is proposed to be made, who shall file such records in his office."
94 OHio REv. CODE § 709.04.
95 56 Ohio App. 344, 10 N.E. 2d 955 (1937).
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The word "thereupon" was taken to mean simply "thereafter" and
not "immediately." It may be granted that council is not bound to
act without a moment's delay, but this is not to say that time avail-
able is not limited by considerations of reasonableness. In two years
and eight months, under present-day conditions, an area could so
change that it would be very different from the one presented in the
petition to the county commissioners. This might be particularly
prejudicial to the interests of new inhabitants of the territory.
Section 709.05 reads: "If the resolution or ordinance rejects the
application, no further proceedings shall be had, but such rejection
shall not be a bar to application thereafter to the county commissioners
on the same subject." If an application is allowed the next step is the
completing and filing of records of the proceedings. 96
In the Decker case, an "annexation" ordinance had originally
been voted down in council. A new council was elected; a motion to
reconsider was adopted, and annexation was approved. The court
concluded that the original vote did not bar "further proceedings"
because the statute reads "reject" and there was no rejection here but
only a failure to accept annexation. Even if it were a rejection the
court declared the council retained jurisdiction through the motion
to reconsider and "such legislative action is not fully disposed of
until a vote to reconsider has been defeated, or the time for making
such motion has passed." It is true that council action is not final until
the period for reconsideration under council rules has expired, but
the suggestion that the form of the ordinance-affirmative or negative
-is controlling lacks substance.
II. ANNEXATION ON APPLICATION OF MUNICIPALITY
Annexation on application of a municipal corporation is also
instituted by a petition to the county commissioners. The council of
the municipality must pass an ordinance directing the solicitor of
the municipality, or some one to be named in the ordinance, to
prosecute the necessary proceedings. Only "contiguous territory" may
be annexed. The other method, it will be recalled, applies to "adjacent"
territory. It is not believed that a difference in meaning was intended.
"Like proceedings shall be had in all respects, so far as applicable,"
as are required under the freeholder method. 97 This section incor-
906 The "further proceedings" referred to here are the filing by the municipal
clerk of two certified transcripts of the annexation proceedings, one with the county
recorder and one with the secretary of state. OHio REv. CODE § 709.06; Bach v. Goff,
24 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 561, 34 Ohio Cir. Dec. 766 (1904); aff'd without opinion, 70 Ohio
St. 508,72 N.E. 1154 (1904).
97 OHio REV. CODE § 709.15.
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porates the substantive and procedural elements of the code sections
which relate to annexation on application of freeholders which, in
turn, incorporate the substantive and procedural elements of the code
sections which relate to incorporation of villages.98 A municipality
doubtless may annex contiguous unplatted lands and also lands which
include a county or village infirmary.9 9 This latter conclusion is
supported by the provisions of Section 709.17, which specifically
disenfranchise, for this particular vote, electors who are inmates or
resident employees of a county institution that is located in an area
sought to be annexed.
When annexation is instituted by a municipality the applicant
need not appoint an agent as is required in the freeholder method. 0 0
The statute does ordain, as we have seen, that the council in the
ordinance authorizing the annexation, direct the municipal solicitor
or someone else named in the ordinance to prosecute the proceedings
necessary to effect annexation. The procedure of the freeholder method
it not "applicable" in this context.
The most pronounced difference between the two modes of
annexation is provided in Section 709.17 which requires an election
to be held in the "area sought to be annexed at the next general or
primary election occurring more than thirty days after the ordinance
which initiates the annexation proceedings is passed by the municipal
council. All annexation proceedings are stayed until the result of
the election is known. If the vote is against annexation no further
proceedings shall be had.., for five years." It should first be pointed
out that the vote is by electors of the entire unincorporated area of
the township and not the area to be annexed.
Prior to a statutory amendment of 1947 the election was con-
fined to voters residing in the area proposed to be annexed. From the
urban standpoint this is extremely backward legislation. Urban growth
is vigorously outward and it is bad enough, from the municipal point
of view, to be confronted with a power of veto in the electors of the
area proposed to'be annexed, let alone to face a possible veto by the
voters of the full township. It is to be noted, however, that an adverse
vote under this section is not a bar to annexation upon application of
freeholders.10 '
The five-year limitation is difficult to justify under any circum-
stances, particularly when the rapidly changing character of districts
adjacent to municipalities is considered. It is common knowledge that
the complexion of an area can be changed from open country to
shopping center in much less than five years. Further, the residents
98 See OHio REv. CODE §§ 709.15 and 709.03.
99 1946 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 1335.
100 Pollock v. Toland, I Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 315 (1903).
101 1949 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 745.
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of the unincorporated area of the township not to be annexed are not
without recourse. They may seek judicial review to determine if the
annexation is right, just, and equitable. 102
The requirement of an election when a municipality institutes
annexation proceedings was added in 1945. Prior to this an area could
be annexed against the wishes of its inhabitants. 103 An interesting
question which has never been decided is this: Did the addition of
this election section take away the discretion of the commissioners in
granting or denying the application for annexation? May they still
determine if it is right that annexation be granted or that the area
to be annexed is unreasonably small or large? One possible argument
is that the election procedure replaces the discretion of the com-
missioners, and they, at the most, may only re-examine errors in
procedure. This is particularly plausible if Section 709.17 is considered
a special law which modifies the prior general laws in this particular
aspect. Another obvious alternative is that the election is to amplify
the wishes of the township and persons involved and only implements
the final policy determination of the commisioners. No aid is re-
ceived from case law.
Another, and perhaps the final, difference between the two
methods of annexation arises after the election has been held and the
county commissioners have approved the application for annexation.
Under the freeholder method, if the proceedings are not enjoined,
it is necessary, in order to complete annexation that the municipal
council pass an ordinance accepting the application for annexation.
Is this requirement "applicable" where the council instituted the
proceedings? The Attorney General has expressed the opinion that it
would be "useless and absurd" to require this in instances where the
council was the initiating force which is not the situation in the
freeholder method. 0 4 An opposite result was reached in one common
pleas decision, 05 but the Attorney General's opinion appears more
persuasive. Why have council reaffirm its desire for annexation?
A problem of some difficulty would be presented were a munici-
pality, which is barred by an election from annexing an area, to
institute proceedings to annex a larger territory embracing the original
area. A related problem would arise if only part of the area formerly
attempted to be annexed were made the subject of a later proceeding.
If the change in area were superficial the second proceeding would
102 Hall v. Siegrist, suprt, note 78.
103 This is obvious from the language of the pre-1945 statutes. In an 1895 case it
had been unsuccessfully urged that annexation without consent of those affected would
be unconstitutional since it would involve taxation without consent for local objects
already accomplished. State ex rel. v. Cincinnati, 52 Ohio St. 419, 40 N.E. 508 (1895).
104 1939 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 1266.
105 Shipbaugh v. Kimball, 7 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 514, 19 Ohio Dec. (N.P.) 33 (Com.
Pl. 1908).
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be vulnerable. If there were a substantial difference in area and the
case for annexation in the second proceeding were not the same on the
merits it should not be considered barred unless we are going to say
that the bar automatically controls as to any or all of the original area.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Annexation, whether commenced upon application of a citizen
or of a municipality, is subject to judicial review. This review is by
suit against the municipal clerk or auditor to enjoin further proceed-
ings.10 6 In a backhanded way Section 709.07 allows judicial review, at
the instance of "any interested person," in annexation proceedings
on application of freeholders. The statutes relating to annexation upon
application of a municipality are silent as to judicial review. On the
merits, it is by no means clear that the injunction procedure is avail-
able. Section 709.16 simply provides that where a municipality takes
the initiative like proceedings shall be had in all respects, "as far as
applicable, as are required" in the other method of annexation. Judi-
cial review is permissible under the other method but not required.
In the cases it has simply been assumed that this form of judicial re-
view was available.
Under the freeholder method, after the municipal council passes
the resolution accepting annexation, the record of proceedings is
forwarded -to the auditor or clerk of the municipality. A petition for
injunction may be filed within sixty days from this time. In instances
where the municipality commences annexation, as has been pointed
out, formal acceptance is not required. It would appear, then, that in
such an instance, a petition for an injunction must be filed within
sixty days from the time the county commissioners file the papers
with the municipal auditor.107 Sections 709.08 and 709.09 relate to
the making of the record after an injunction suit.
Since Section 709.03 embraces by reference the procedure used
in incorporation of villages, the same rules apply as to proper party
plaintiff, filing of petitions, discretions of the court and appeal.
The policy with respect to judicial review is subject to the same
criticism in this context as in incorporation proceedings.
WHEN ANNEXATION Is COMPLETE-APPORTIONMENT
In the case of annexation at the instance of freeholders, the
territory is to be deemed a part of the municipality when the resolu-
100 OIo REv. CODE § 709.07.
107 We do not have great confidence in this statement; the statutes do not give
one enough helpl
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tion or ordinance accepting annexation has been adopted. This is the
case even though, in a given situation, the clerk has not completed
the record108 or the municipal council has not, by ordinance, accepted
the apportionment of debts and funds required by Section 709.12.
There is no express provision on this point with respect to municipally
initiated annexation. If judicial review is available, as has been assumed
in the cases, the annexation could not be perfected until the expiration
of the sixty-day period for filing an injunction proceeding or the
final disposition of such a proceeding adversely to the plaintiff, as the
case might be.
Section 709.12 provides for apportionment of township indebted-
ness and "unencumbered balance (s) on hand," by the county auditor.
The apportionment "shall not be in effect until it is accepted by
ordinance or resolution of the legislative authority of the annexing
municipal corporation." The passage of such resolution or ordinance
shall be necessary to the validity of the annexation.
It would appear that apportionment should be made at the date
on which annexation becomes complete; otherwise, matters would
be most awkward since everything would have to be pro-rated. So it
would be, were apportionment to be made as of the date annexation
proceedings were initiated.109 The language of the statute lends some
support to a contrary conclusion. It is to the effect that the auditor
shall make the apportionment when annexation proceedings have been
commenced. Conceivably, this was designed to facilitate final action.
A strong countervailing consideration is that to say, in effect, that the
county auditor may determine the apportionment date, is to give him
a discretion affecting the substance of the apportionment, whereas it
is pretty clear from the remaining language of .the section that his
function was intended to be ministerial.
Once the municipality accepts apportionment by ordinance, it is
bound and cannot later ask for a reapportionment because of newly
discovered matters.110
Debt must be apportioned if the area being annexed would not
as a part of the municipality be subject to township debt service tax
levies. The statute requires that the apportionment be made in the
proportion of the total tax duplicate for the annexed area to the total
tax duplicate for the unannexed portion of the township. In other words,
if each such total were $10,000,000 the proportion would be: one is to
one! No doubt, what was contemplated was that the municipality
108 OHIO Rav. CODE § 709.10 provides that when the resolution or ordinance
accepting annexation has been adopted by the legislative authority of a municipal
corporation the affected area is "deemed a part of the munidpal corporation."
109 1943 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 6475. In State ex rel. Ellis, City Solidtor v.
Heuck, County Auditor, 42 Ohio App. 367, 182 N.E. 141 (1932), the latter procedure
was followed but the question was not at issue.
110 State ex rel. Ellis, City Solidtor v. Heuck, County Auditor, supra, note 109.
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would assume a share of the township debt bearing the same ratio
to the total "net indebtedness" of the township that the total tax
duplicate for the annexed area bore to the total duplicate for the
township as it stood with the annexed area included.
There is no definition of "net indebtedness." Perhaps the courts
would indulge a look at the Uniform Bond Act for light on the sub-
ject. For purposes of that act net indebtedness is determined by de-
ducting from the total of the par value of the outstanding bonds and
votes of the local unit the, amount held in sinking funds and other
indebtedness retirement funds for their redemption. (Certain obliga-
tions such as bonds issued in anticipation of the collection of special
assessments are excluded from gross debt for this purpose.)
The municipality is required to provide for debt service on that
portion of township debt assumed by it. The municipality does not,
however, deal directly with the holders or creditors but transmits
funds to the proper township authorities for application. The statute
does not expressly refer to interest on debt; it speaks of final redemp-
tion of the township debt, which smacks of principal.
It is required that any unencumbered balance on hand in any
township fund, except a fund required by law for retirement of town-
ship indebtedness, shall be divided on the same basis as the burden of
net indebtedness.
Unlike Section 707.28, which applies to incorporation, this ap-
portionment section does not refer to taxes and other funds in process
of collection. Thus, no division of them is indicated. Again, this sec-
tion is silent as to township realty and tangible personal property.
Accordingly, no division is called for.
One interesting question which seems to have received little
judicial consideration, is what is the effect of annexation on contracts
which relate to the annexed area and which were entered into by the
township before annexation was complete. Annexation does not, of
course, impair the obligations of contracts. Conceivably, contracts
relating to the annexed area could be deemed to involve indebtedness
within the meaning of the apportionment statute, but this would pro-
duce an inequitable result where all the services under the contract
were rendered in the area to be annexed. In State ex rel. Dayton
Power &Light Co. v. Lutz,"' the township trustees had entered into
a contract providing for lighting certain territory which was annexed
to Dayton. The Court declared the land in such area was still liable
for special assessments, as provided under the contract, even though
no apportionment under Section 709.12 had been made. The result
in this case is fair, but a better thought out apportionment statute
might have prevented this litigation.
111 14 Ohio L. Abs. 130 (App. 193).
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EFFECT OF ANNEXATION
When annexation has been completed under either method the
inhabitants of the annexed area "shall have all the rights and privileges
of the inhabitants within the original limits" of the municipality."12
Conversely, it doubtless follows that they have the same duties as the
inhabitants of the municipality.
Apparently one of the "rights and privileges" gained by inhab-
itants of the area annexed is to vote in municipal elections, without
first satisfying the general residence qualifications for an elector. This
point has never been isolated in a case but has been assumed in
judicial proceedings. 113 The wording of the statutes includes this
result, and there is no actual conflict with the general election laws
as this is a special law which is an exception thereto.
By statute, territory annexed to a municipality becomes a part
of the municipal school district; the title to school property in the
territory is vested in the board of education of the municipality."14
When territory is annexed the municipality gains control over all
highways and roads in the area;115 this is subject, however, to the
existing grades. 16 The municipality is amenable to liability under
existing statutes."17 Any action for injury done to highways or roads
must be prosecuted by the municipality and not by township trustees
or county commissioners."18
The Code contains validating provisions with respect both to
irregular incorporations and irregular annexation. They have not
been authoritatively interpreted. The section as to incorporation
reads:
"No error, irregularity, or defect in any proceeding for the crea-
tion of a municipal corporation shall render it invalid if -the territory
sought to be incorporated has been recognized as such municipal cor-
poration, and if any tax levied upon it as such has been paid, or if
it has been subjected to the authority of the municipal legislative
authority without objection from its inhabitants." 119
This applies to both methods of incorporation. It will be seen
112 OHIO REV. CODE § 709.10.
113 Bach v. Goff, supra, note 96.
114 OHIO REV. CODE § 3311.06.
115 Lawrence Railroad Company v. Commissioners, 35 Ohio St. 1 (1878). By
this is meant local control, subject to such state and federal control as may be exercised
with respect to state and U.S. highways.
116 City of Dayton v. Haines, 12 Ohio App. 439 (1919).
117 As to claims arising after annexation. From that point the municipality has
a statutory duty, under Section 723.01, to keep streets in repair.
118 Lawrence Railroad Company v. Commissioners, supra, note 115.
119 OHIO REv. CoDE § 707.27.
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that the first two conditions are stated in the conjunctive and the
third in the disjunctive. The section relating to annexation applies
only to annexation at the instance of a municipality. 120 It contains the
same three conditions as the incorporation provision but expresses
all of them in the conjunctive. It would be of some interest to engage
in interpretive speculations about recognition of a municipality, and
so on, but we shall forebear.
There is a very badly worded old statute which permitted annexa-
tion of part, and doubtless all, of a village to an adjoining city. It was
so unhappily drawn that its meaning was difficult to determine. The
revisers have changed its language in an effort to make it reasonably
clear. Their revision of the principal section is reproduced below.1 2 1
As it now reads, it plainly permits annexation to a city only of a part
(not all) of an adjoining village. Action is initiated by (a) application
of the legislative authority of the city and (b) written request of
a majority of -the voters of the territory of the village or of two-thirds
of the resident voters of any part of the territory of the village. Pre-
sumably this reference to "any part" is to the particular part proposed
to be annexed. The statute formerly authorized the county commis-
sioners to cause the "alteration" to be made responsive to the applica-
tion and required the commissioners to proceed in accordance with
the general annexation statutes "as far as applicable." The revision
omits the quoted phrase. This does not expressly take into account
the existence of two methods of annexation of unincorporated terri-
tory, but it does not appear that there are differences which are
significant for present purposes.
The statute employs the same faulty formula for apportioning
debt as the general annexation statute. "The apportionment shall be
made in the proportion of the total tax duplicate for the annexed
territory -transferred to the city to the total tax duplicate remaining
in and for the unannexed portion of the village." In other words if
half of the village, in terms of taxable values, were taken, the pro-
portion would be one is to onel
The home rule aspects of this statute have already been con-
sidered.
120 OHio REv. CODE § 709.21 makes this clear by reference to section numbers.
121 OHO REV. CODE § 709.35: When a city and a village adjoin each other, and
the inhabitants of territory constituting any part of such village desire to be annexed
to such adjoining city, on application of the legislative authority of the city and on
written request of a majority of the voters of the territory of such village, or, on the
written request of two thirds of the resident voters of any part of the territory of such
village, the board of county commissioners may cause such alteration to be made, and
the boundaries of the city and the village, respectfully, to be established in accordance
witth [sic] the application and request, and such territory thereafter shall constitute
part of the city. In all such proceedings, the board shall be governed by sections 709.02
to 709.21, inclusive, of the Revised Code.
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In 1938 provision was made by statute for the adjustment of the
boundaries of adjoining municipalities by mutual consent. 22 The
legislative authorities of two adjoining municipalities may agree by
reciprocal ordinances to a change in "the boundary line separating"
them, but such action may not effect transfer of territory inhabited by
more than five voters. The ordinances are certified to the county
commissioners and that board must proceed by resolution to approve
the change and to make such adjustment of funds, unpaid taxes,
claims, and other fiscal matters as it determines to be proper.
DETACHMIENT (DISANNEXATION)
Prior to the adoption of the Home Rule Amendment in 1912 it
was determined that detachment of municipal territory was a local
concern and, thus, not within -the requirement that laws of a general
nature have uniform operation throughout the state. 23 Whatever the
merits of that decision, it is clear enough to the writers that the Home
Rule Amendment contemplates that there be no more special legisla-
tion as to municipalities. 124
If annexation and detachment are on a common footing, so far
as state-local relations are concerned, detachment is no longer to be
considered a local affair. If they are not on common ground, we might
wind up by placing detachment in the home rule category.
To the extent that the ground for detachment is that an area
has never been or at least is not now suitable for urbanization, it is
difficult, rationally, to say that the decision is necessarily for the
municipality to make. It can be urged with some conviction, however,
that cutting off municipal -territory on any other ground without
municipal consent would impair the integrity of the municipality as
a home rule unit. This contention has been rejected by the Court of
Appeals for Cuyahoga County in a case involving annexation of part
of a village to a contiguous city under a pre-home rule statute. 2 5
The statutes authorize three different methods of detachment.
They are: (1) petition addressed to county commissioners; (2) de-
tachment by election; and (3) petition to common pleas court.
PETITION ADDREssED To COUNTY COMISSIONERS
A majority of the freehold electors' 26 owning lands in "any
122 OHIO REV. CODE § 709.37.
123 Metcalf, Auditor v. State, 49 Ohio St. 586, 31 N.E. 1076 (1892).
124 See text above note 70, supra.
125 See note 6, supra.
126 Onto REv. CODE § 709.38. A petition of "freehold electors" owning land in
the area is required. If there are none, as where corporations own all the land, the re-
quirement cannot be met. See 1928 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Ohio) No. 3061.
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portion" of the territory of a municipality may petition the county
commissioners for the detachment of that portion from the municipal-
ity, and the commissioners, with the assent of the council of the
municipality given by ordinance, shall detach the portion from the
municipality and attach it to any contiguous township, or if requested
in the petition, shall erect the territory into a new township. Since it
is not required that the specified area be on the municipal periphery,
it would be possible, under the language of the statute, to carve a
new township out of the heart of a municipality. Apportionment of
indebtedness and monies and credits of the municipality is required.
".... after such apportionment is made each section of the original
territory by which the indebtedness was incurred shall be primarily
liable for the portion of the indebtedness so apportioned. .. ."
Nothing is said concerning municipal property. What of municipal
facilities situated in the area detached? Does location control?
The county commissioners have no discretion under this statute.
Given the proper factors they must grant detachment. There is one
limitation on their jurisdiction. Where no new township is to be
formed there must be a contiguous township to which the area may
be attached. If, as we interpret the statute, the action of the petitioners
controls, subject to the assent of the municipal legislative body, is
not the decision of the public question placed in private hands?
DETACHMENT BY ELECTION
The inhabitants residing in any portion of a village (not a city),
"such portion being contiguous to an adjoining township," and being
not less than 1500 acres in extent, may request an election upon the
question of detachment by filing with the board of elections a petition
which contains "signatures equal in number to fifteen per cent of
the total number of votes cast at the last general election in such
territory."'127 The petition must contain (a) an accurate description of
the affected area, (b) an accurate plat or map of the area, (c) if the
creation of a new township is sought, the name proposed for it, and
(d) the name of a person to act as agent for the petitioners. Within
ten days after the petition is filed the board of elections "shall" deter-
mine if it conforms to the requirements of the statute. If it does the
board shall order an election to be held in not less than ten or more
than twenty days thereafter.'2 8 If a majority of the votes are against de-
tachment, further proceedings are barred for two years. If the majority
favor detachment the result, the original petition, and plat and a
transcript of all the proceedings of the board must be certified by it
127 OHio REv. CODE § 709.39.
128 Here, again, we have provision for an election on very short notice.
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to the county recorder who, in turn, must make a record of them and
certify a transcript of the record to the Secretary of State. The de-
tachment of territory "shall thereupon be complete."
Under this procedure consent of the village legislative body is
not required. That squarely presents the home rule question previous-
ly mentioned.
The requirement that the affected area be "contiguous to an
adjoining township" has not been taken literally. In a recent unre-
ported decision of the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga County129 de-
tachment was allowed even though the area to be detached comprised
a large part of the township and the remainder of the township was
within the limits of other municipalities with the effect that there was
no unincorporated township territory at the outset.
Section 709.40 provides for apportionment of the property, funds
and indebtedness of the village. It must be made upon the basis of
the "respective tax duplicates" of the village and detached territory.
No definite apportionment formula is prescribed. Water pipes and
sewers are to be considered as property, within the meaning of this
section, to the extent that they have been paid for from the general
funds of the village. If the village authorities and public authorities
"in control of" the detached territory are unable to agree upon an
apportionment it must be made by the probate court upon application
either of the authorities of the village or those of the "detached terri-
tory." Unless set up as a new township that territory would not have
governing authorities as such but would, of course, be under jurisdic-
tion of a pre-existing township.
PETITION TO COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
The owner of unplatted farm lands, annexed to a municipality
after its incorporation, may petition the court of common pleas of
the county of situs for detachment at any time after the lands have
been annexed for five years. 130 The proceeding is an adversary con-
test between the owner as plaintiff, and the municipality as defendant.
If the court finds the lands are farmlands and not within the original
corporate limits of the municipality, that the taxes thereon for muni-
cipal purposes are in substantial excess of the benefits conferred by
reason of being within the municipality, and that the lands may be
detached "without materially affecting the best interests or good
government" of the municipality or the territory therein adjacent to
the territory sought to be detached, an order and decree may be made
129 Burroughs v. Wasserman; motion to certify denied by Supreme Court (case
no. 32869, Jan. 16,1952).
130 OHIO REV. CODE § 709.41.
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by .the court that the lands be detached from the municipality and
attached to the most convenient adjacent township in -the same county.
These sections have been declared constitutional.131 The objection
that -they involve delegation of legislative power to the judiciary has
not prevailed.
There is no provision for apportionment of debt and funds. Would
not this ground the conclusion that -there would be none? The area
detached would, doubtless, not be subject to municipal debt service
levies for bonds issued between annexation and detachment, since
the possibility of detachment existed from the outset.
CONCLUSION
Through the efforts of the Bureau of Code Revision and cooperat-
ing organizations and individuals the State of Ohio has been able to
take a tremendous stride forward in the organization of its statute law.
The Revised Code is a significant achievement. It is the basic stage
in the needed process of continuous revision. The State may now,
within the Revised Code framework, set about substantive revision,
"in manageable bites," of the parts of the Code which call for re-
examination at the policy level.
It is to be remembered that all Ohio municipalities, charter and
non-charter, have substantive home rule powers under the Home Rule
Amendment of 1912. In a series of decisions, the latest of which places
urban redevelopment in the home rule category,13 2 the Ohio Supreme
Court has made home rule much, much more meaningful. Yet, the
so-called Municipal Code, which dates from 1902 and has much pre-
1902 material in it, deals with municipal government and administra-
tion, for the most part, as though there were no home rule amendment.
It is fraught with provisions on substantive matters within the sweep
of home rule powers. This is basis enough for thorough re-examination
of the municipal corporations title of the Revised Code.
We nominate for early study the existing legislation on municipal
incorporation and territorial changes. It is hopelessly outmoded and
it never had much policy content. The problems of urban life are
too difficult, too important, too pressing for the State to suffer the
continuance of this condition of its statute law.
131 The Incorporated Village of Fairview v. Giffee, 73 Ohio St. 183, 76 N.E. 865
(1905).
132 State ex rel. Bruestle, City Solicitor v. Rich, Mayor, 159 Ohio St. 13 (1953).
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